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Abstract—The unprecedented growth of demand for charging
electric vehicles (EVs) calls for novel expansion solutions to to-
day’s charging networks. Riding on the wave of the proliferation
of sharing economy, Airbnb-like charger sharing markets opens
the opportunity to expand the existing charging networks without
requiring costly and time-consuming infrastructure investments,
yet the successful design of such markets relies on innovations
at the interface between game theory, mechanism design, and
large scale optimization. In this paper, we propose a price-
based iterative double auction for charger sharing markets where
charger owners rent out their under-utilized chargers to the
charge-needing EV drivers. Charger owners and EV drivers form
a two-sided market which is cleared by a price-based double
auction. Chargers’ locations, availability, and time unit costs as
well as the EV drivers’ time, distance constraints, and preferences
are considered in the allocation and scheduling process. The goal
is to compute social welfare maximizing allocations which benefits
both charger owners and EV drivers and, in turn, ensure the
continuous growth of the market. We prove that the proposed
double auction is budget balanced, individually rational, and that
it is a weakly dominant strategy for EV drivers and charger
owners to truthfully report their charging time constraints. In
addition, results from our computation study show that the
double auction achieves on average 94% efficiency compared with
the optimal solutions and scales well to larger problem instances.
Index Terms—Electric vehicle, charging scheduling, sharing,
double auction, iterative bidding, two-sided markets, social wel-
fare.
I. INTRODUCTION
ENERGY spent on charging electric vehicles (EVs) willgrow tremendously in the next decade. As estimated
by the International Energy Agency, annual charging energy
demand for the EV population is projected to increase from 58
billion kilowatt-hours to 640 billion kilowatt-hours from 2020
to 2030. This surging demand places an unprecedented strain
on existing charging networks which need to be substantially
expanded in terms of the total amount of energy delivered and
their geographical coverage. However, traditional methods to
expand the charging networks such as building new charging
stations and upgrading to high speed DC chargers are often
costly and time-consuming. In recent years, charger sharing
has emerged as one of the cost-effective and immediate
solutions to expand the existing charging networks [1], [2].
Online charger sharing platforms are being built to connect
private charger owners and EV drivers. Some popular ones
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include PlugShare1, EVMatch2, ChargeHub3, Share&Charge4,
CHRG Network5 and ELbnb6.
Using such platforms, private charger owners aim to rent
out under-utilized chargers to recoup their installation and
operation costs and EV drivers wish to procure the charging
services to satisfy their energy needs.
The success of charger sharing platforms hinges on two ma-
jor issues: (i) attracting both charger owners and EV drivers to
the platform by providing added values to both of the groups,
and (ii) retaining them by computing charging scheduling and
pricing solutions which maximize the social welfare across
all participants. Social welfare maximization benefits both EV
drivers and charger owners and ensures sustainable growth
of these platforms. The first issue requires the engineering
of individual rationality [3] into the sharing mechanisms,
while the second issue calls for market-based charger sharing
mechanisms which optimize the overall resource allocation in
game-theoretic settings.
At the present time, the main scheduling mechanisms used
by the charger sharing platforms are variants of the First-
Come-First-Served (FCFS) mechanism with the “take-it-or-
leave-it” pricing schemes. While these mechanisms do mo-
tivate charger owners and EV drivers to participate if the
price is right, however, they do not possess the property of
individual rationality. Furthermore, these mechanisms do not
explicitly consider game-theoretic behaviors of participants in
their mechanism design, nor ensure the optimality of computed
scheduling solutions even when FCFSs are replaced with a
centralized optimization algorithm due to the market nature of
the charger sharing environment. In market environments, EV
drivers and charger owners are independent and self-interested
agents, and the optimization algorithm may not have access
to all the needed charging scheduling information because the
information is privately held by the agents who cannot be
assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-
interests. In this decentralized setting, agents may behave
strategically in the pursuit of their own benefits rather than
the system-wide optimality.
Charger sharing mechanism design is a relatively new
research topic and the literature on it is limited. As a more
general research area, EV charging scheduling has attracted
increased attention in the past years. Comprehensive reviews
1https://www.plugshare.com/
2https://www.evmatch.com/
3https://chargehub.com/en/
4https://shareandcharge.com/
5https://chrg.network/
6https://www.thelocal.se/tag/elbnb
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2can be found in [4] and [5]. Several studies [6]–[10] have
tackled EV charging scheduling problems by applying cen-
tralized approaches, which assume that a central scheduler is
responsible for all allocation decisions. However, these central-
ized approaches cannot be applied to EV charging scheduling
problems in the context of a charger sharing market. This
market is naturally decentralized [3], [11], in which scheduling
information are distributed and controlled by different self-
interested agents.
Market based approaches, such as auctions, have gained
popularity in providing socially desirable solutions to decen-
tralized EV charging scheduling problems. These approaches
respect autonomy and private information inherited from a dis-
tributed system and can provide incentives for agents to reveal
truthful information [12]. For example, P. Samadi et al. [13]
propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) based mechanism for
EV charging scheduling with the objective of maximizing the
social welfare. In a related approach, J.de Hoog et al. [14]
design a market mechanism for smart charging that optimally
allocates available capacity and, at the same time, ensures
network stability.
However, these studies address the setting of one-sided
markets with one charger supplier. They cannot be directly
applied to two-sided charger sharing markets. In [15], an
EV charging scheduling problem is studied in a two-sided
market. The authors propose a VCG payment rule to ensure
truthfulness of EV drivers and charging stations. Although the
VCG mechanism is well known for being truthful and socially
optimal, implementations of VCG-type mechanisms generally
suffer from excessively high computational costs [16] and are
impractical for charger sharing markets with large numbers of
charger owners and EV drivers.
Two-sided markets which involve two distinct groups of
players, e.g., stock markets, are normally cleared by double
auctions. In his seminal paper, McAfee [17] proposes a
trading reduction rule to achieve truthfulness in two-sided
markets with homogeneous single unit goods. For the same
problem, Chu and Shen [18] propose an agent competition
mechanism by applying shadow prices to achieve strategy
proof. More recently, some research has attempted to design
double auctions for multi-unit heterogeneous trading problems.
For example, Y. Chen et al. [19] extend McAfee’s mechanism
to multi-unit heterogeneous settings. They apply the proposed
mechanism to spectrum allocation problems. In [20], a two-
sided combinatorial greedy allocation mechanism is applied to
multi-unit heterogeneous cloud exchange markets. In addition,
iterative double auctions based on a decomposition scheme
have been proposed for multi-unit heterogeneous energy trad-
ing environments [21]–[25]. In these double auctions, trading
goods are distinct, indivisible items. In order to apply these
double auctions to the charger sharing scheduling problem,
the continuous scheduling time line has to be discretized,
such that the charging time period can be converted to a
set of distinct time units [11], [26]. However, to maintain
time accuracy, the discretized time unit cannot be too large.
Therefore, this approach can generate a large number of
distinct time units, which inflicts heavy computation burden on
double auctions in terms of bids evaluation, communication,
and winner determination [27], [28]. In [29] and [30], the
authors use scheduling specific bidding language for decen-
tralized scheduling problems, which models scheduling related
constraints naturally and reduces computation costs. However,
both papers focus only on one-sided settings where there is
only one seller in the market.
In this paper, we design a price-based iterative double
auction for the charger sharing scheduling (CSS) problem in
two-sided sharing markets. In this auction, charger owners
(sellers) submit asks to indicate their available charging times,
locations and time unit costs. EV drivers (buyers) place bids to
express their charging time requirements and prices they are
willing to pay. The auction then allocates buyers to sellers
through iterative bidding with the aim of maximizing the
social welfare which is the difference between EV drivers’
total values and charger owners’ total costs. We assume that
sellers and buyers follow myopic best-response strategies [31],
[32], which means they place best-response bids to the current
prices. This is a reasonable assumption for large markets with
many participants and for bidders with bounded computation
capacities and/or limited information [24]. The main contribu-
tions are summarized as follows.
• We formulate a new CSS problem with the objective of
maximizing the social welfare of both EV drivers and
charger owners in a two-sided charger sharing market.
• We propose a price-based iterative double auction which
guarantees individual rationality, budget balance and al-
locative efficiency. In addition, the designed mechanism
ensures that reporting truthful charging time constraints is
a weakly dominant strategy for EVs and charger owners.
This mechanism only incurs a small communication over-
head and clears the market without knowing the private
information of the participants.
• We design a fast winner determination algorithm based
on simulated annealing meta-heuristic. Equipped with
this algorithm, the proposed double auction can compute
high-quality solutions to large scale CSS problem with
low computational cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the charger sharing scheduling problem and
present its mathematical model. In Section III, we present
the structure and components of the proposed auction. A
theoretical analysis on the properties of the auction is provided
in Section IV followed by a computational study in Section V.
Finally, in Section VI, we conclude our work and discuss
future improvements.
II. THE CHARGER SHARING SCHEDULING PROBLEM
We consider a charger sharing market which consists of a
set of private charger owners, a set of EV drivers (henceforth
called sellers and buyers), and a scheduler. Each seller provides
his or her charging service offer to the market. The offer of a
seller includes a location, an available time window and a cost
of one time unit charging in the available time window. Buyers
have preferences over charging services offered by different
sellers. Each buyer prefers a seller with the most convenient
location, charging time and the lowest service cost. Those
3preferences are quantified by the highest prices they want to
pay, which will be referred to as values. The decision of the
scheduler is to allocate each buyer to a seller, such that the
social welfare (the difference between the allocated buyers’
values and the allocated sellers’ costs) is maximized and the
scheduling constraints of both buyers and sellers are satisfied.
Let M be the set of sellers and let N be the set of buyers,
where m ∈ M defines an arbitrary seller and n ∈ N an
arbitrary buyer. Each seller m submits his or her location and
type to the charger sharing market. Let lm = (fm, gm) be the
location of seller m, where fm and gm represent the latitude
and the longitude of the location, respectively. A type of each
seller m is defined as follows:
Definition II.1. Each seller m is characterized by a “type”
αm = (sm, em, cm), which denotes the service start time,
service end time and the charging cost for one time unit,
respectively.
We refer to [sm, em] as the available charging time window
offered by seller m, during which the seller is available for
providing its charger to EV drivers. More specifically, sm
and em are the earliest and latest service times of seller m.
cm ∈ R+ is the charging cost of seller m for a time unit. The
cost consists of electricity cost and parking cost. Electricity
cost is the cost of electricity consumed within a time unit for
charging a vehicle. Parking cost refers to the one time unit cost
associated with the operation of the charging space, property
tax, insurance, maintenance or rental costs.
In this market, a buyer may have different types for sellers
due to the different travelling distances to those sellers. A type
of buyer n is defined as follows:
Definition II.2. Each buyer n is characterized by a “type”
θn,m = (an,m, dn,m, rn,m, vn,m) for a particular seller m,
indicating the arriving time, departure time, required charging
duration and the charging value or willingness to pay, respec-
tively. The set of all possible types of buyer n is denoted by
θn.
We refer to [an,m, dn,m] as the available charging time
window of buyer n for seller m. an,m and dn,m indicate the
earliest time that buyer n can start to charge at seller m and
the latest time by which this buyer has to finish at seller m,
respectively. Note that, for buyer n, if an,m < sm, this buyer
has to wait until the available charging time window of seller
m is open. This means the earliest possible start charging time
of buyer n at seller m is sm. On the other hand, if dn,m > sm
for a seller m, buyer n has to finish at time sm, even his or
her latest departure time is dn,m. rn,m ∈ R+ is the required
charging duration of buyer n for seller m. A charging request
is non-preemptive, i.e., once buyer n is started charging at
seller m, it must continue charging for rn,m time units. Each
buyer n can have different values regarding the sellers he or
she would like to charge at. The valuation vn,m ∈ R+ indicates
the maximum price for which buyer n is willing to pay for
charging at seller m.
We assume that buyers are single-minded [33]. A single-
minded buyer only has two possible states: either he or she
obtains the entire charging duration rn,m for a particular
seller m within his or her available charging time window
and derives a value of vn,m, or the value is zero for any
duration less than rn,m. This means each buyer’s charging
request cannot be partially fulfilled.
Example 1. As shown in Fig. 1, the charger sharing market
has two sellers and one buyer. Seller 1 and seller 2 submit
their locations l1 and l2 and types (13:00, 17:00, $1.5) and
(15:00, 19:00, $1) to the market, respectively. Based on these
information, Buyer 1 has a type θ1,1 = (12:00, 16:00, 2, $4)
for seller 1 and a type θ1,2 = (16:00, 20:00, 3, $5) for seller
2. The feasible start charging time of buyer 1 is constrained by
the time windows of sellers and also itself. In this case, buyer
1’s start charging time is either 13:00 or 14:00 on seller 1,
and 16:00 on seller 2. The feasible charging time windows of
buyer 1 at both seller 1 and seller 2 are highlighted in grey.
Fig. 1: Example of a CSS problem
Given the types from sellers and buyers, the solution to the
CSS problem is a schedule which can be represented by a
matrix L ∈ R|M|×|N|, where each element ln,m denotes the
start charging time of buyer n ∈ N at seller m ∈ M. Let
ln,m ∈ R+ if n is allocated to m, and ln,m = −1 otherwise.
A feasible schedule L in our problem setting is defined as
follows:
Definition II.3. A schedule L is feasible if for every element
ln,m ≥ 0 it satisfies the following constraints:
(i) Buyer n cannot start before its arriving time, i.e., ln,m ≥
an,m,
(ii) Buyer n cannot finish after its departure time, i.e., ln,m ≤
dn,m − rn,m,
(iii) Buyer n can only start once, i.e., ∀m,m′ ∈M: if ln,m 6=
−1 and ln,m′ 6= −1 then m = m′,
(iv) If any buyers n and n′ are allocated to the same seller,
either n must be finished before the start charging time of
n′ or n′ must be finished before the start charging time
of n, i.e., ∀n, n′: if ln,m 6= −1 and ln′,m 6= −1, then
ln,m+rn,m ≤ ln′,m+H ·(1−Yn,n′,m) and ln′,m+rn′,m ≤
ln,m +H · Yn,n′,m7,
(v) If buyer n is allocated to seller m, the charging time
should be within m’s available time window, i.e., sm ≤
ln,m ≤ em − rn,m ,
7Yn,n′,m is the disjunctive variable: Yn,n′,m = 1 when n is scheduled
before n′ on m and Yn,n′,m = 0 n′ is first. H is a large positive constant
which is used for the linearization of the logical constraint “if” [34].
4(vi) If buyer n is allocated to seller m, the buyer’s value
cannot be less than the cost of the seller, i.e., ∀n,m: if
ln,m 6= −1, then vn,m ≥ rn,m · cm.
Let 1ln,m 6=−1 be the indicator function that equals 1 if
ln,m 6= −1 is true and 0 if otherwise. The social welfare of a
feasible schedule L is then defined as the difference between
the sum of the allocated buyers’ values and the sum of the
allocated sellers’ costs:∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
(vn,m − rn,m · cn) · 1ln,m 6=−1 (1)
which is the value the scheduler aims to maximize.
Since we consider a game-theoretic setting, sellers and
buyers are modeled as self-interested agents and may provide
untrue types if these are in their best interest. Here we need
to define notations for reported types. Let αˆm = (sˆm, eˆm, cˆm)
denotes the reported type of seller m and θˆn = (θˆn,m : m ∈
M) denote buyer n’s reported types, in which a single reported
type is represented as θˆn,m = (aˆn,m, dˆn,m, rˆn,m, vˆn,m). Let
αˆ−m and θˆ−n denote all seller and buyer reported types except
that of m and n, where αˆ = (αˆm, αˆ−m) and θˆ = (θˆn, θˆ−n).
Note that αˆm and θˆn may not be equal to αm and θn. In this
paper, we assume restricted reports which means sellers cannot
report an earlier service start time nor a later service end time
and buyers cannot report an earlier arrival nor a later departure
time. More formally, we assume sˆm ≥ sm and eˆm ≤ em for
all seller m ∈ M and for each buyer n, aˆn,m ≥ an,m and
dˆn,m ≤ dn,m, ∀m ∈M.
As the scheduler is unaware of the private information of
sellers and buyers. Given the reported types, the scheduler
might make sub-optimal decisions. Therefore, to efficiently
allocate buyers to sellers, we propose a price-based iterative
double auction to solve the CCS problem in charger sharing
markets.
III. PRICE-BASED ITERATIVE DOUBLE AUCTION
In this section, we propose a price-based iterative double
auction (P-IDA) for the CSS problem. Compared with one
shot auctions, such as VCG [13]–[15], the iterative bidding
structure of the proposed auction promises reduced compu-
tation at the auctioneer side and partial revelation of the
private information at buyers’ and sellers’ sides [32], [35].
In addition, compared with single-sided multi-round auctions,
such as those proposed in [29]–[31], the two-sided structure
of P-IDA facilitates trade between two groups in one market,
which is more efficient than combining several single-sided
auctions [36].
A. The P-IDA structure
As shown in Fig. 2, P-IDA involves a group of sellers M,
a group of buyers N and an auctioneer. The auction proceeds
in rounds and during each round t, sellers submit asks to the
auctioneer which include the charging time windows they offer
for sale and their ask prices. Let αˆtm = (sˆm, eˆm, p
s,t
m ) denote
the ask of seller m at round t, where ps,tm indicates the ask price
in round t for a time unit. At the same time, buyers submit
Fig. 2: The P-IDA structure
bids to the auctioneer which specify their available charging
time windows, required charging duration, and their bid prices.
Let θˆtn,m = (aˆn,m, dˆn,m, rˆn,m, rˆn,m · pb,tn,m) denotes the bid of
buyer n for seller m at round t, where pb,tn,m indicates the
bid price of a time unit in round t. Thereafter, the auctioneer
evaluates the bids and asks to determine a provisional feasible
schedule Lt with the objective of maximizing the social wel-
fare. The auctioneer can also use an approximation algorithm
for winner determination when the size of the model is too
large to be optimally computed in a reasonable time. After
receiving the provisional schedule from the auctioneer at round
t, sellers and buyers will update their time unit prices ps,tm and
pb,tn,m and submit the updated ones to the auctioneer for the next
bidding round. The auction terminates when the termination
conditions are satisfied.
In the following subsection, we formulate the winner deter-
mination model for the auctioneer to compute a social welfare
maximizing provisional schedule during each round.
B. Winner determination
The auctioneer solves the winner determination model dur-
ing each round, computing a provisional schedule to maximize
the social welfare. The winner determination model in round
t is formulated as:
max
Lt
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
rˆn,m · (pb,tn,m − ps,tm ) · 1ltn,m 6=−1 (2)
with respect to the feasible schedule constraints (see Defini-
tion II.3 for details). Lt is a provisional schedule at round
t. As multiple optimal solutions may exist, tie-breaking rules
are needed for the auctioneer to decide which of the optimal
solutions is selected. In this paper, ties are broken in favour
of maximizing the number of trades and then at random.
C. Approximate winner determination
The winner determination model can be solved using stan-
dard integer programming optimization packages, such as
ILOG CPLEX. However, due to the NP-completeness of the
5winner determination problem, computing the optimal sched-
ule by using CPLEX is achievable in infeasible computational
time for larger problem instances. Thus, the auction is not
applicable to realistic scenarios in which agents require a
timely schedule. Therefore, to further test the efficiency of the
proposed double auction in large scale settings and to foster the
use of P-IDA in real practical applications, an algorithm which
is based on meta-heuristic simulated annealing (SA) [37] is
designed to solve the winner determination model during each
bidding round for the auctioneer.
The SA algorithm starts by randomly generating an initial
schedule based on the bids and asks submitted by buyers and
sellers in each bidding round. Then the SA proceeds in several
iterations. At the beginning of each SA iteration, multiple
schedules are generated by a random permutation of the initial
schedule. A schedule is always selected if it has a superior
social welfare than that of the initial schedule, otherwise a
schedule is accepted with a given decreasing possibility which
is based on Boltzmann distribution [37]. In the final iteration
of SA, the schedule with the highest social welfare will be
the provisional schedule for buyers and sellers in the current
bidding round. Ties are broken at random. This “P-IDA-SA”
approach maintains the same incentive for buyers and sellers
to follow myopic best-response bidding strategies [38].
As the winner determination model takes the bid prices and
the ask prices as inputs, we then specify the bidding and
price updating rules for buyers and sellers in the following
subsection.
D. Bidding and price updating rules
Initially, buyers and sellers receive from the auctioneer a
minimum and a maximum time unit price for charging. The
minimum price is a reserve price which reflects the basic
charger installation cost and electricity fees. Any bid prices
lower than such price are deemed as invalid and will be
rejected by the auctioneer. The maximum time unit price is
a highest reference value capturing a proportion of property
tax, charger construction cost, maintenance cost and electricity
fees. Any ask prices higher than such reference will be rejected
by the auctioneer. Let bmin ∈ R+ be the minimum time unit
price for all bids and amax ∈ R+ be the maximum time unit
price for all asks, with bmin < amax. Based on bmin and
amax, buyers and sellers set up their first round bid prices
and ask prices.
1) Buyer’s and sellers’ bidding rules: At the beginning of
round t − 1(t > 1), buyers need to compute a set of utility-
maximizing bids among all their bids based on the bid prices
and values. To compute such a set, a buyer n ∈ N solves the
utility maximization problem:
max
θˆt−1n,m∈θˆt−1n
(vn,m − rˆn,m · pb,t−1n,m ) · 1ltn,m 6=−1 (3)
and obtains a set of bids which equally maximize his or her
utility, where pb,t−1n,m is the bid price of buyer n for seller m
at round t− 1. That is, for any two bids θˆt−1n,1 and θˆt−1n,2 in the
utility maximization set: vn,1−rˆn,1·pb,t−1n,1 = vn,2−rˆn,2·pb,t−1n,2 .
After obtaining utility maximization bids at round t − 1, the
buyer can have two bidding strategies: he or she can randomly
pick one (single-bid bidding strategy) or join them together as
an XOR-bid (xor-bid bidding strategy) [39] and submits it to
the auctioneer. An XOR-bid:
θˆt−1n,1 ⊕ θˆt−1n,2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ θˆt−1n,m
indicates that:
• these bids equally maximize buyer n’s utility at round
t− 1 based on the bid prices and his or her values,
• at most one θˆt−1n,k can be accepted by the auctioneer.
Meanwhile, at the beginning of round t−1, a seller m ∈M
submits the ask to the auctioneer if this seller has available
charging time.
After receiving the bids from buyers and asks from sellers
at round t− 1, the auctioneer solves the winner determination
problem and sends the provisional schedule Lt−1 back to the
buyers and sellers. At the beginning of round t, buyers and
sellers need to update their bid prices and ask prices based
on the provisional schedule Lt−1 at round t − 1. The price
updating rules of buyers and sellers are given as follows.
2) Buyer’s and seller’s price updating rules: If a buyer is
not included in the provisional schedule Lt−1, this buyer has
the following two price updating options in round t:
• This buyer can increase his or her bid prices by  >
0 on sellers that this buyer bid for at round t − 1 or
rounds before t−1. Here  is the minimum bid-increment
in the auction for buyers. As buyers are assumed to be
rational in maximizing their utilities, they do not bid with
an increment more than .
• This buyer can keep his or her bid prices unchanged
or make an increment less than . It happens when the
utility of all other bids are non-positive. In this case,
the auctioneer will consider that this buyer has entered
into the final bid status and the buyer is forbidden from
increasing the bid prices of those bids in the future
rounds.
If a buyer is included in the provisional schedule Lt−1, this
buyer can keep its bidding price unchanged at round t. That
is, the buyer is allowed to repeat the same bid at round t.
Note here, for a buyer with the xor-bid bidding strategy, the
repeated bid at round t should be the awarded one in XOR-
bid at round t−1. However, the auctioneer can also choose to
allow the buyer to repeat its XOR-bid in future rounds until
the auction terminates. The purpose for this xor-bid-repeating
is to boost the efficiency of the auction. After updating the
bid prices, buyers recompute their utility-maximizing bids by
using (3). If there are multiple utility-maximizing bids, this
buyer can randomly pick one or joint them as XOR-bid for
the next bidding round t.
Example 2. Consider a buyer n ∈ N with xor-bid bidding
strategy submits a bid θˆ1n,k to the auctioneer in the first round.
Suppose after computing the winner determination problem
by the auctioneer, he or she is not included in L1. Buyer n
will increase pb,1n,k to p
b,1
n,k + . After updating the bid price,
buyer n recomputes the utility maximization bids and obtains
two bids θˆ1n,k and θˆ
1
n,k′ . Thereafter, in the second round, he
or she submits θˆ2n,k′ ⊕ θˆ2n,k to the auctioneer, where θˆ2n,k′ =
6(aˆn,k′ , dˆn,k′ , rˆn,k′ , p
b,2
n,k′) and θˆ
2
n,k = (aˆn,k, dˆn,k, rˆn,k, p
b,2
n,k).
In this case, pb,2n,k′ = p
b,1
n,k′ and p
b,2
n,k = p
b,1
n,k + w · . If 0 ≤
w < 1, buyer n cannot increase his or her bid price on k in
the future round. As buyers are rational utility maximization
agents, they will not bid with a w > 1.
Given a provisional schedule Lt−1, if a seller sells all of
his or her available charging time at round t − 1, the seller
repeats his or her ask at round t.
If, on the other hand, a seller m ∈ M still has available
charging time at round t− 1, this seller has the following two
ask price updating options in round t:
• This seller can decrease the time unit price by  > 0 at
round t, where  is the minimum ask-decrement in the
auction for sellers. As sellers are assumed to be rational
in maximizing their utilities, they do not bid with an
decrement more than .
• This seller can keep the ask price unchanged or make a
decrement less than . This happens when ps,t−1m = cm
or ps,t−1m − cm ≤ . In this case, the seller is not allowed
to decrease his or her ask prices in the future rounds.
E. Termination condition and trading prices
Once the auctioneer receives the bids and asks from buyers
and sellers, the auctioneer checks the termination condition.
The auction terminates when:
• (T1) all buyers and sellers submit the same bids and asks
in two consecutive rounds.
On termination, the provisional schedule becomes the final
schedule, and buyers pay their final bid prices to the auction-
eer. Each seller’s reimbursement is the sum of the allocated
buyers’ bid prices.
Let tT denotes the final bidding round. Given the schedule
and the prices at tT , the utility of a buyer n is defined as:
ubn(L
tT , θˆt
T
n ) =
{
vn,m − pb,tTn,m · rˆn,m if 1ltTn,m 6=−1 = 1,
0 otherwise.
(4)
Accordingly, a seller m’s utility is defined as:
usm(L
tT , αˆt
T
) =

∑
n∈N
rˆn,m · (pb,tTn,m − cm) if 1ltTn,m 6=−1 = 1,
0 otherwise.
(5)
F. Algorithm implementation
The entire P-IDA is described in details in Algorithm 1.
The auctioneer initializes the minimum bid price for buyers
and maximum ask price for sellers (i.e., bmin and amax)
and also the increment or decrement  (Line 2). For such
an initialization, we can choose any set of values that satisfy
bmin < amax. Before the bid starts, all sellers set up their
initial ask prices ps,1m with p
s,1
m ≤ amax. The auctioneer
then broadcasts the locations and asks of the participating
sellers to the buyers. After receiving this information, buyers
compute their bids for each feasible seller. The initial bid price
pb,1n,m for each buyer should satisfy p
b,1
n,m ≥ bmin. Then the
Algorithm 1 Price-based iterative double auction
Input: lm, αˆm, θˆn, w(0 < w ≤ 1), ∀m ∈M,∀n ∈ N
Output: Lt
1: t← 1;
2: Initialize pb,1n,m, p
s,1
m , ;
3: flag ← 0;
4: while flag = 0 do
5: for all n ∈ N do
6: if t > 1∧ n is not included in Lt−1 then
7: for all θˆt−1n,m submitted at round t− 1 do
8: ptn,m = p
t−1
n,m + w · ;
9: end
10: Solve utility-maximizing bids by (3);
11: Send bids to the auctioneer;
12: end
13: for all m ∈M do
14: if t > 1∧ m has available time in round t−1 then
15: ptm = p
t−1
m − w · ;
16: end
17: Send the ask to the auctioneer;
18: end
19: if T1 is satisfied then
20: flag ← 1;
21: break;
22: end
23: The auctioneer computes Lt by (2) with respect to
feasible schedule constraints;
24: The auctioneer sends the provisional schedule Lt to
buyers and sellers;
25: t← t+ 1;
26: end
27: The auctioneer collects payment pb,tn,m from each buyer
and reimburse to the corresponding sellers;
auctioneer will iteratively compute the provisional schedule
given the bids and asks until the termination condition is
satisfied. In the first bidding round, each seller submits his
or her asks to the auctioneer and each buyer obtains the
utility-maximizing bids among his or her bids by solving (3)
and sends the bid (single-bid or xor-bid) to the auctioneer.
The auctioneer generates a provisional feasible schedule Lt
by solving the winner determination problem and sends Lt
back to the buyers and sellers. After receiving the provisional
schedule Lt, the unscheduled buyers and the sellers who
still have available charging time will update their prices.
After receiving the updated prices, the auctioneer checks the
termination condition. If the termination condition T1 is not
satisfied, the auctioneer takes the updated prices from buyers
and sellers as inputs and computes the provisional schedule
for the next bidding round. When the auction terminates, the
auctioneer determines the final payments and reimbursements
for buyers and sellers. The last round provisional schedule will
be the final schedule.
Compared with one-shot VCG auction, the proposed P-
IDA has two main advantages. Firstly, in solving the CSS
7problem, P-IDA has improved computational properties. The
VCG is a sealed bid auction which motivates agents to submit
their complete valuations truthfully and computes optimal
solutions [16]. However, despite its theoretical elegance, it has
its limitations in terms of implementation [40]. Specifically,
from the auctioneer’s side in solving the CSS problem, the
implementation of VCG auction requires |M|+ |N |+ 1 NP-
complete optimization problems. Therefore, the computational
cost of the VCG auction is prohibitively expensive if the
auction is applied to a CSS problem with nontrivial-size.
However, the iterative bidding structure of P-IDA can help to
distribute the computation in the auction [12], [38]. Although
the winner determination problem during each bidding round
remains NP-complete, the problem instances in P-IDA are
much smaller than that in VCG as buyers only bid for a
small subset of sellers in each round, which largely reduces the
computational complexities [32]. In addition, P-IDA preserves
the privacy of buyers and sellers. In the VCG, agents need
to submit their complete valuations [12] to compute a final
schedule. However, in P-IDA, agents are not required to
submit complete and exact information about their private
information.
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the economic properties of P-
IDA. We prove that P-IDA is budget-balanced and individually
rational. Budget balance ensures that the auction requires
no outside subsidy which incentives the auctioneer (or the
platform) to organize such an auction. Individual rationality
implies that participants are never worse off by participating in
the auction which attracts both buyers and sellers to participate
in this auction. In addition, we prove that under this auction
the weakly dominant strategies for buyers and sellers are to
truthfully reveal their charging time constraints. This property
simplifies the strategic space of the participating buyers and
sellers, and enables more efficient allocations.
Remark 1. P-IDA is budget-balanced because the total pay-
ments collected from the buyers is equal to the total reward
assigned to the sellers.
Theorem 1. P-IDA is individually rational for all participat-
ing buyers and sellers.
Proof. This theorem will be established separately for the
buyers and the sellers. Note that not participating in the auction
leads to a zero utility for any buyers and sellers as they will
not receive or offer any charging services nor they will pay any
kind of fee. For an arbitrary buyer n ∈ N , upon termination of
the auction, if he or she is not included in the final schedule,
then the utility of buyer n is zero: ubn = 0 (see Equation (4)).
If on the other hand, buyer n ∈ N is allocated to an arbitrary
seller m ∈M when the auction terminates, then the utility of
buyer n is vn,m − pb,tTn,m · rˆn,m, where pb,t
T
n,m is buyer n’s last
round bid price. Since pb,t
T
n,m · rˆn,m ≤ vn,m always holds, it
follows that:
ubn = vn,m − pb,t
T
n,m · rˆn,m ≥ 0.
Therefore, it is concluded that P-IDA is individually rational
for all participating buyers.
If an arbitrary seller m is not included in the final schedule,
then usm = 0 (see Equation (5)). If, on the other hand, seller
m is included in the final schedule, to satisfy the feasible
schedule constraint (vi), we have pb,t
T
n,m − ps,t
T
m ≥ 0 always
holds, where ps,t
T
m is seller m’s ask price in the last round.
Since ps,t
T
m ≥ cm, it follows that
pb,t
T
n,m − cm ≥ pb,t
T
n,m − ps,t
T
m ≥ 0.
Therefore,
usm =
∑
n∈N
(pb,t
T
n,m − cm) · rˆn,m ≥ pb,t
T
n,m − cm ≥ 0.
Thus we conclude that P-IDA is individually rational for all
participating sellers.
To prove truthfulness of P-IDA, we need to show that for an
arbitrary buyer n ∈ N and seller m ∈M, regardless of other
agents’ bids and asks, n and m can never gain by submitting
untruthful charging time constraints, subject to the restricted
reports assumption.
We first prove that this mechanism is truthful for buyers in
reporting their charging time constraints. We start by showing
that if truthful reveals of an,k, dn,k, rn,k do not cause buyer
n to be allocated to seller k, then strategically reveals of
these variables can never cause the buyer to be allocated
to seller k. We break this part of proof into two lemmas,
first showing that it holds for the arriving time regardless
of other variables (Lemma 1), and then for departure time
and required charging duration (Lemma 2). According to the
single-minded assumption, a buyer will not report a length of
charging shorter than the true length which means for each
buyer n, rˆn,m ≥ rn,m, ∀m ∈M.
Lemma 1. In P-IDA, it is a weakly dominant strategy for
buyers to truthfully report their arriving times.
Proof. Let θˆ′n = (θˆ
′
n,k : k ∈M), where each element θˆ′n,k =
(an,k, dˆn,k, rˆn,k, rˆn,k · pb,tn,k) indicates that buyer n truthfully
reports his or her arriving time an,k. To prove this lemma we
need to show that
ubn(θˆ
′
n, θˆ−n,θn) ≥ ubn(θˆn, θˆ−n,θn) (6)
holds for all buyers. First we randomly select one bid θˆ′n,k
from buyer n and assume that this is the bid upon termination
of the auction. Then we consider the following two cases:
Case 1: If ln,k 6= −1, which means buyer n is allocated to
seller k in the final schedule, then ln,k ≥ an,k. Given restricted
reports assumption, we have aˆn,k ≥ an,k and the following
two possibilities:
1). an,k ≤ ln,k < aˆn,k, then buyer n cannot be allocated
by reporting θˆn,k = (aˆn,k, dˆn,k, rˆn,k, vˆn,k). Hence, we can
derive:
ubn(θˆ
′
n,k, θˆ−n,θn) ≥ ubn(θˆn,k, θˆ−n,θn) = 0.
2). an,k ≤ aˆn,k ≤ ln,k, then buyer n can be allocated by
reporting θˆn,k = (aˆn,k, dˆn,k, rˆn,k, vˆn,k). Thus:
ubn(θˆ
′
n,k, θˆ−n,θn) = u
b
n(θˆn,k, θˆ−n,θn) ≥ 0.
8Case 2: If ln,k = −1, which means buyer n is not
included in the final schedule. We prove this case by using
contradiction. First, we assume buyer n is included in the final
schedule by reporting θˆn,k. Let lˆn,k be the allocated starting
time. Therefore, we have aˆn,k ≤ lˆn,k 6= −1. Based on the
restricted reports assumption, the following inequality holds:
an,k ≤ aˆn,k ≤ lˆn,k.
It means that buyer n will be allocated to k in the final
schedule by reporting θˆ′n,k, a contradiction. Therefore,
ubn(θˆ
′
n,k, θˆ−n,θn) = u
b
n(θˆn,k, θˆ−n,θn) = 0.
As buyer n and seller k are an arbitrary selection, we can
conclude that Equation (6) holds for all buyers.
Lemma 2. In P-IDA, it is a weakly dominant strategy for
buyers to truthfully report their departure times and required
charging duration.
Proof. Let θˆ′′n = (θˆ
′′
n,k : k ∈ M), where each element
θˆ′′n,k = (aˆn,k, dn,k, rn,k, p
b,t
n,k) indicates that buyer n truthfully
reports his or her departure time dn,k and required charging
time duration rn,k. To prove this lemma, we need to show the
following inequality holds for all buyers:
ubn(θˆ
′′
n, θˆ−n,θn) ≥ ubn(θˆn, θˆ−n,θn). (7)
We randomly select one bid θˆ′′n,k from buyer n and assume
that this is the submitted bid upon termination of the auction.
Then we have the following two cases:
Case 1: ln,k 6= −1, which means buyer n is included in the
final schedule by reporting θˆ′′n,k, thus we have:
ln,k ≤ dn,k − rn,k ∧ ln,k ≤ ek − rn,k.
According to the restricted reports and single-minded assump-
tion, we have dˆn,k − rˆn,k ≤ dn,k − rn,k. Therefore, the
only possibility that buyer n is included in the final schedule
by reporting θˆn,k is that the following two inequalities are
satisfied at the same time:
ln,k ≤ dˆn,k − rˆn,k ≤ dn,k − rn,k,
and
ln,k ≤ ek − rˆn,k ≤ ek − rn,k.
If (13) and (14) are satisfied, then:
ubn(θˆ
′′
n,k, θˆ−n,θn) = u
b
n(θˆn,k, θˆ−n,θn) ≥ 0.
Otherwise,
ubn(θˆ
′′
n,k, θˆ−n,θn) ≥ ubn(θˆn,k, θˆ−n,θn) = 0.
Case 2: ln,k = −1, which means buyer n is not included
in the final schedule by reporting θˆ′′n,k. We prove this case
by contradiction. We assume buyer n is included in the final
schedule by reporting θˆn,k. Then we have:
ln,k ≤ dˆn,k − rˆn,k ∧ ln,k ≤ ek − rˆn,k.
Given that dˆn,k < dn,k and rˆn,k > rn,k, we derive:
dˆn,k − rˆn,k ≤ dn,k − rn,k ∧ ek − rˆn,k ≤ ek − rn,k.
This immediately follows that:
ln,k ≤ dn,k − rn,k ∧ ln,k ≤ ek − rn,k.
It means that buyer n will be allocated to seller k by reporting
θˆ′′n,m, a contradiction. Therefore,
ubn(θˆ
′′
n,k, θˆ−n,θn) = u
b
n(θˆn,k, θˆ−n,θn) = 0.
As buyer n and seller k are an arbitrary selection, deriving
from the above two cases, we can conclude that Equation (7)
holds for all buyers.
Theorem 2. In P-IDA, it is a weakly dominant strategy for
each buyer to truthfully report their available charging time
windows and required charging time duration.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows directly from the
above two lemmas. In Lemma 1 we proved that for each buyer,
truthful reveal of his or her arriving time is a weakly dominant
strategy and in Lemma 2 we proved that it is a weakly
dominant strategy for each buyer to truthfully reveal his or
her departure time and required charging duration. Therefore
we conclude that the proposed P-IDA is truthful for all buyers
in reporting their charging time constraints.
Theorem 3. In P-IDA, it is a weakly dominant strategy for
each seller to truthfully report their available time windows.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we need to show that the
following condition holds for all sellers:
usm(αm, αˆ−m, αm) ≥ usm(αˆm, αˆ−m, αm). (8)
Assume by contradiction this condition does not hold, which
means there exists a buyer allocated to seller m when sˆm and
eˆm are untruthfully reported, but this buyer is not allocated to
m for a truthful report. Randomly select a buyer n ∈ N and
assume n is allocated to seller m by reporting αˆ. Based on
the feasible schedule constraint (v), we get:
sˆk ≤ lb,k ≤ eˆ− rb,k.
Given sˆm ≥ sm and eˆm ≤ em, we have the following
inequality that always holds:
sk ≤ lb,k ≤ e− rb,k.
This means that seller m will have an allocated buyer n by
reporting sk and ek, a contradiction.
As seller m and buyer n are an arbitrary selection, we can
conclude that Equation (8) holds for all sellers.
V. COMPUTATIONAL STUDY
In this section, we conduct a computational study to verify
the performance of P-IDA in terms of efficiency, profit ratio
and running time under different problem scales and various
configurations. We first define the evaluation metrics, after
that we describe the experiment settings and then analyze the
experiment results.
9A. Experimental Evaluation Metrics
The evaluation metrics are defined as follows:
• Efficiency of scheduling, eff(L), is measured as the
ratio of the social welfare of the final schedule L to the
social welfare of the optimal schedule L∗
eff(L) =
∑
(i,j)∈L(vi,j − ri,j · cj)∑
(i,j)∈L∗(vi,j − ri,j · cj)
(9)
where L is the final schedule generated by the auction and
L∗ is the optimal schedule which maximizes the social
welfare.
• Profit ratio of the auction, pro(L), is measured as the
sum of sellers’ payoff in the final schedule L, as a fraction
of the sum of the payoff in the optimal solution L∗ that
maximizes the social welfare
pro(L) =
∑
(i,j)∈L(p
b
i,j − cj) · ri,j∑
(i,j)∈L∗(vi,j − ri,j · cj)
(10)
where pbi,j is the bid price of buyer i for seller j in the
final schedule L and (bi,j−cj) ·ri,j is the payoff of seller
j in L. The profit ratio metric is designed to measure the
degree to which the sellers make money by applying the
auction.
• Running time of the auction refers to the computation
time needed to terminate the auction on a CSS problem
instance.
B. Settings
The scheduling horizon is a 15 hour window on the next
day from 07:00-22:00 and it is divided into 30 time units of
half an hour. For each seller m, the service start time sm is
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution in the range of
07:00-14:00. We assume sellers offer at least 16 time units of
charging service. Therefore, the available charging time unit is
a uniform random number from [16,min{30, 2 · (22− sm)}].
Based on sm and the available charging time units, the service
end time em of seller m can be directly generated. The time
unit cost of each seller various from $1 to $2.5 with a step
$0.1.
For each buyer n, an arriving time an,m is randomly
drawn from a uniform distribution in the range of 07:00-
21:30. According to a survey [41], the peak intervals of
EV charging include 08:00-10:00, 12:00-14:00 and 18:00-
20:00. Thus, we vary the relative proportions between the
buyers to represent varying levels of heterogeneity in the
buyer population. Specifically, our data is designed to ensure
that 20% of buyers are arrived during each of these three
peak time intervals. A departure time dn,m of each buyer
n is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution in the
range of [an,m + 1,min{an,m + 8, em}] and required charg-
ing duration follows a uniform distribution over the interval
[1,min{dn,m − an,m, CR ], where C is a constant number,
representing the maximum battery capacity (kWh) and R is the
constant charging rate (kW) delivered at the charging station.
For simplicity, we assume C = 80 kWh for all buyers and
R = 10 kW for all sellers. The time unit value (willingness to
pay) of each buyer various from $0.1 to $5, with a step $0.1.
We assume the number of bids for each buyer is a random
number from interval [1, 0.4 · M ], where M is the number
of sellers. For testing P-IDA, we have defined 15 groups of
testing data which are shown in TABLE I. For each group, 10
instances are randomly generated.
TABLE I: Testing data
Group Sellers Buyers # Instances
1 4 5 10
2 4 10 10
3 4 15 10
4 4 20 10
5 5 5 10
6 5 10 10
7 5 15 10
8 5 20 10
9 6 5 10
10 6 10 10
11 6 15 10
12 6 20 10
13 20 50 10
14 20 100 10
15 20 150 10
C. The performance of P-IDA
The results of P-IDA over Groups 1-12 are compared with
the First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) algorithm in terms of
efficiency. FCFS is a classic centralized scheduling algorithm
which gives the priority to buyers who has an earlier arriving
time. The optimal solutions for Groups 1-12 are computed
by using Cplex8 solver. The FCFS algorithm and P-IDA are
implemented in Python.
The optimal solutions and the efficiency results of P-IDA
and FCFS over 12 groups with  = 0.2, amax = 7 and
bmin = 0.1 are shown in Fig. ??. It is observed that P-
IDA with single-bid can achieve on average 94% of the
efficiency against the optimal solution among the 12 groups,
outperforming the solution obtained by FCFS allocation policy
(around 88% on average out of 100%). This makes sense
because the FCFS policy allocates buyers to sellers according
to the buyer arrival order rather than the social welfare.
In Fig. ?? (a), we compared the efficiency of P-IDA on the
three bidding rules, single-bid, xor-bid and xor-bid-repeating
with different values of . The results are averaged over
the 12 groups. It is demonstrated that, bidding with xor-
bid-repeating has higher efficiency (on average 98%) than
single-bid (on average 94%) and xor-bid (on average 97%).
However the cost is the increased computation time due to
the complexity of solving the winner determination model.
With xor-bid-repeating, the size of the winner determination
model is usually larger than that of xor-bid and single-bid,
and also the auctioneer may have to respect the hard XOR-
bid constraints during each bidding round when solving the
winner determination model. Therefore, the computation time
of P-IDA is significantly increased with xor-bid-repeating,
especially when the value of  is small. As shown in Fig. ??
8https://www.ibm.com/analytics/cplex-optimizer
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(b), with  = 0.1, the computation time of xor-bid-repeating
is 6 times longer than xor-bid and single-bid. Also, the
computation times of all these three bidding strategies are
decreased by increasing the value of . This is because 
controls the rate at which the prices of buyers and sellers
are increased and decreased across rounds. Therefore, with
lower value of , the auction needs more rounds to clear
the market which in turn, increases the computation time. As
shown in Fig. ?? (c), with  = 0.1, the P-IDA with single bid,
xor-bid and xor-bid-repeating will terminate after 59 rounds
and down to around 6 rounds with  = 0.5. In addition to
that, more rounds requires buyers and sellers to submit more
bids and asks which reveals more value and cost information.
In theory, more private information revelation contributes to
higher auction efficiency. Therefore, as shown in Fig. ?? (a),
the efficiency of the auction with small value of  usually
achieves higher efficiency than a larger one. However, in our
auction, even with a large value of  ( = 0.5), bidding with
single-bid can reach above 94% efficiency and more than 97%
efficiency with xor-bid and xor-bid-repeating, averaged over
the 12 groups. This verifies that the proposed double auction
has high efficiency.
Fig. ?? shows the profit ratio performance of P-IDA aver-
aged over the 12 groups with  = 0.2 and bmin = 0.1. It
reveals that the higher value of amax allows achieving higher
profit ratio. For example, with amax = 7, P-IDA achieves on
average 70% profit ratio for these three bidding strategies and
decreases dramatically to less than 45% with amax = 5 and
around 13% with amax = 3. This makes sense because for
each buyer, the allocation requirement is that the bid price of
each buyer should be greater than or equal to the ask price of
a feasible seller. When updating the bid prices and ask prices,
a large value of amax requires more rounds to terminate the
auction, which increases the possibility that a buyer reaches
his or her value when the auction terminates. However with
small value of amax, the bid prices of buyers will quickly
catch up with the ask prices of sellers, which increases the
chance that P-IDA allocates a buyer with a relatively low
bid price. Fig. ?? also shows that the profit ratio achieved by
high efficiency bidding strategy, xor-bid-repeating, is slightly
higher than xor-bid and single-bid. With amax = 7, P-IDA
with xor-bid-repeating generates 70% profit ratio, compared
to 63% for xor-bid and 60% for single bid. This indicates that
there is a positive correlation between the profit ratio and the
efficiency. The high level of profit ratio is accompanied by
a high efficiency bidding strategy (xor-bid-repeating). Clearly
the cost is the high running time.
D. The performance of P-IDA-SA
The SA meta-heuristic algorithm is designed to solve the
winner determination model in large scale settings where the
optimal solutions cannot be computed in a reasonable time.
In this subsection, we test the performance of P-IDA-SA
on Groups 13-15. The solutions generated by P-IDA-SA are
compared against those generated by the FCFS and also a
greedy allocation mechanism adapted from [20]. The greedy
allocation mechanism performs well for resource allocation in
two-sided markets, but this is not a truthful mechanism for
sellers and also it requires complete valuations of buyers and
sellers [20].
TABLE II: The social welfares of P-IDA-SA, Greedy alloca-
tion and FCFS on Groups 13-15.
Group P-IDA-SA Greedy FCFS P-IDA-SA Run
Time (s)
13 333.8 333.5 192.1 5
14 622.0 607.8 367.2 49
15 812.4 772.9 496.5 310
The solutions computed by P-IDA-SA are compared against
the greedy allocation mechanism and also FCFS. The second
column of TABLE II shows the average social welfare of each
group computed by P-IDA-SA. All buyers are assumed to
adopt xor-bid bidding strategy with  = 0.2, amax = 7 and
bmin = 0.1. By applying SA to solve the winner determination
model, we set the iteration number R = 1000 and the permu-
tation number m = 32. It is observed that the social welfare
obtained by the proposed P-IDA-SA is on average 4% higher
than that generated by the greedy allocation mechanism. The
fourth column displays the social welfare computed by FCFS
allocation policy. Clearly, our auction achieves a significant
improvement over FCFS for all testing groups, achieving on
average 40% higher social welfare. These indicate that P-IDA-
SA performs well in realistic large scale settings even without
having access to complete information of buyers and sellers.
Additional, based on the run time results, the proposed P-
IDA-SA is capable of solving large problem instances with
high responsiveness.
VI. CONCLUSION
We propose a price-based iterative double auction to com-
pute social welfare maximizing schedules in charger sharing
markets. The proposed auction is suitable for the two-sided
structure of the market and possesses desirable economic prop-
erties such as budget balance, individual rationality and truth-
fulness in reporting scheduling constraints. From the theory
perspective, we advance the existing literature by extending
one-sided auction-based scheduling to two-sided markets by
proposing a double auction-based decentralized scheduling
mechanism. In addition, the proposed auction is also interest-
ing from practical application perspective. It achieves much
better allocative efficiency than the first-come, first-served
charger scheduling scheme which has been commonly used
by charger sharing platforms. It also scales well to larger
problem instances, which indicates its potential to be used for
large scale charger sharing platforms. In this paper, we only
applied the double auction to a day-ahead charging setting.
In our future work, we plan to extend the iterative bidding
framework to accommodate online dynamic charger sharing
scheduling settings. The results presented in this paper pave
the foundation and serve as the baseline for the planned
extension.
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